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Good Fences Make Good Neighbors: an Investigation on the Place of Law 
and its Limits in the Context of the Brazilian Private Law Movement Escola 
do Direito Civil-Constitucional 
 
Abstract:  In  this  paper,  an  analysis  of  Robert  Frost’s  poem  Mending  Wall
3is  presented  as a 
hermeneutical  key to investigate  and  criticize two  examples  of  the  oblivion  of  the  reasonable 
distinction and the reasonable relationship between ethics and law prop osed by a new Brazilian 
private law movement called Escola do Direito Civil -Constitucional (The Private-Constitutional 
School of Thought). Those examples of unreasonable relationship between ethics and law are: 1) the 
right to be loved and 2) the right to get a private education without paying for it. 
Keywords: Mending wall, Robert Frost, Ethics and law, The Brazilian Private -Constitutional School 
of Thought 
 
Introduction 
As Martha Nussbaum (1995) observes, the literary imagination is a part of public rationality. 
It is not the whole of public rationality. But as a part, it plays a fundamental role. It is an 
ingredient  of  an  ethical  ground  that  sustains  the  universe  of  rules  and  formal  decision 
procedures (the universe of the law). The impoverishment of this ground necessarily implies 
in  a correlate impoverishment on the field  of law.  Law  cannot  be separated  from  ethics. 
Notwithstanding,  today,  there  is  a  movement  on  Brazilian  private  law  towards  a 
mischaracterization of some important institutes of private law in the name of some not well 
understood constitutional ethical principles. This movement is known as Escola do Direito 
Civil-Constitucional (The Private-Constitutional School of Thought). It is as if the law should 
carry the responsibility of being the source of every ethical (and theological) virtue. It is, of 
course, a movement in which both ethics and law are misunderstood. One thing is to know 
that law cannot be separated from ethics. This is right. A different thing is to think that law 
must command every ethical or theological virtue. This is a mistake. And even worse, it is a 
mistake that signifies a threat both to ethics and law. In this paper, we will use an analysis of 
Robert Frost’s poem Mending Wall as a key to investigate and criticize two examples of the 
oblivion of the right distinction and the right relationship between ethics and law proposed by 
this new Brazilian private law movement.  
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Mending Wall is a long one-stanza poem published in 1914. It is written in blank verse 
and contains a narrative-like style. It opens with an intriguing verse: “Something there is that 
doesn’t love a wall” (this same verse will appear once more in line 35). At this point, by the 
reading of the next nine verses, it seems to be that it is nature that doesn’t love a wall. The 
narrator observes that there are gaps made by hunters and his dogs. But he also observes that 
there are gaps in the wall that were not made by men. Those gaps seems have been made by 
nature. That same verse appears again in line 35. But at that point, considering the previous 
verses, in which the narrator expresses his doubts about the reasons for the very existence of 
walls and relates his dialogue with his neighbor, it seems now that it is the narrator himself 
who doesn’t love a wall. It seems that the narrator does not love the wall and wants it down, 
although his neighbor insists that “good fences make good neighbors”. The statement “good 
fences  make  good  neighbors”  appears  two  times  as  well.  In  both  occasions,  it  is  the 
neighbor’s statement. In fact, it is all the neighbor says. It appears for the first time in line 27, 
and a second time in the last line of the poem. Its first appearance is just an expression of an 
old proverb. That casualness fades away when it appears in the closing of the poem. At that 
point, the narrator is already conscious about the power of violence that is, at the same time, 
encapsulated and frozen in the fence. So, although it seems that the theme of the poem is a 
simple criticism of the existence of walls, a deeper interpretation may show that it is not. 
What does not love a wall is love. Love does not accept fences. As Diotima once taught to 
Socrates, love wants union. The lover wants to be one with her/his beloved. But if it is true 
that love does not love a wall, it is also true that the destruction of a wall does not create love. 
Put in a different way: bad fences (or no fences at all) do not make good lovers, but certainly 
bad fences (or no fences at all) make bad neighbors. 
So, in the world of human affairs, it must be a place for law (represented by walls) as a 
condition for the virtue of justice, and it must be a place for love, as a complete different 
virtue. Although today, in Brazil, the Escola do Direito Civil-Constitucional (The Private-
Constitutional School of Thought) concentrates its efforts in trying to make us believe that the 
law must be a condition not for the virtue of justice, but for the virtue of love. It is as if love 
could be commanded by law. If the narrator of Frost’s poem, in a narrow view, may be 
pictured trying to put the wall down in order to create a kind of a new society in which love 
would be the only virtue and the only law, the Escola do Direito Civil-Constitucional (The 
Private-Constitutional School of Thought), in a more audacious project, goes a different way: 
it wants to create a love society by law. This paper will present two examples of this project.  
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The first example will be called “the right to be loved”. This expression here is not a 
metaphorical  expression.  The  Escola  do  Direito  Civil-Constitucional  (The  Private-
Constitutional School of Thought) thinks that a person has a right of being loved and, as a 
logical consequence, thinks that some other person has a correspondent duty of loving. If the 
person who has the duty of loving fails in performing his/her legal obligation, he/she can be 
condemned to pay a monetary compensation to the one who has been left without his/her due 
love. This absolute nonsense is what has been contemporarily defended in various fields on 
the Family Law by the Escola do Direito Civil-Constitucional (The Private-Constitutional 
School of Thought). Its roots are easy to trace. Once love (taking in modernity not as a virtue 
but  as  a  person  sentiment  of  affection)  is  established  as  the  sole  basis  for  the  family 
institution, since it is possible to detect this feeling, it is possible to detect the constitution of a 
family.  Institutions  such  as  marriage,  for  instance,  are  in  a  process  of  losing  its  formal 
elements (the effects of this loss of formal elements is paradoxical: today, in Brazil, getting a 
divorce is quite an easier task for formally married couples than for those who have chosen 
not  to  marry formally). So, if it is  possible to state that love bonds are important  in  the 
institution of family, it is not correct to conclude that there should be a legal duty to love. But 
this is just the conclusion put forth by the Escola do Direito Civil-Constitucional (The Private-
Constitutional School of Thought). In the relationship between parents and children, the duty 
of loving was added to the traditional duties of respect and mutual assistance. Parents must, 
then,  provide  not  only  for  material  and  traditional  moral  needs  of  education  for  their 
offspring, they are also obliged to provide love. The Escola do Direito Civil-Constitucional 
(The Private-Constitutional School of Thought) talks about “affection/love desertion”, which 
is  thought  as  a  cause  for  a  monetary  compensation.  It  is  not  said  how  a  monetary 
compensation (and how much) can be a proper compensation  for the alleged lack of parental 
love but  it seems not to be a problem. For the Escola do Direito Civil-Constitucional (The 
Private-Constitutional School of Thought) what matters is the institutionalization of love by 
law. 
The second example will be called “going to a private school without paying for it”. One 
of  the  main  theses  proposed  by  Escola  do  Direito  Civil-Constitucional  (The  Private-
Constitutional  School  of  Thought)  is  that  the  contract,  instead  of  a  manifestation  of  the 
person’s autonomy, must be understood as an instrument to achieve solidarity (another kind 
of love) in society. So, a contract that is not a manifestation of solidarity has its obligatory 
power  threatened.  This  way  of  reasoning  has  achieved  the  status  of  a  federal  statute  in 
Brazilian  law.  The  practical  effects  can  be  seen  in  various  places.  It  can  be  seen  in  the  
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contracts  between  private  educational  institutions  and  its  students.  A  student  who  stops 
paying his monthly fees has the right of attending classes and performing all educational 
activities until the end of the class period. The argument behind this right is that such a thing 
as education cannot be subordinated to such a thing as honoring contracts. As it is understood 
by the Escola do Direito Civil-Constitucional (The Private-Constitutional School of Thought), 
the individualistic economics interests of the private schools must not be allowed to overcome 
the right of a person to be educated in  a private school without paying for it. The quite 
paradoxical  outcome  of  this  statute  is  that,  as  recent  researches  shows,  for  a  default 
percentage of 30.3, there is an increase of 15% on the value of the school monthly fees. As it 
is easily observed, the project of transforming contracts in an instrument for solidarity has 
achieved the goal of transforming good payers in compulsory helpers for bad payers. At the 
end, it is not solidarity. Its proper name is exploitation. 
 
The right to be loved 
In  the  90’s,  the  conception  that  the  affect  should  be  the  basis  of  family  institution  was 
spreaded  in Brazilian civil law. Connected with this new conception, a new right arose: the 
right to be loved. Now, the parents have – besides its traditional duties – the duty to love their 
offspring, and the offspring has the right to be loved. In order to justify this new duty and this 
new right, Pereira (2008) affirms that: “man shall not live by bread alone”. Pereira sustains 
that,  by  not  accomplishing  its  new  duty  of  love,  parents  are  responsible  for  “emotional 
abandonment”  of  their  offspring  and  should  be  monetarily  punished  by  this  “emotional 
abandonment”. According to Pereira, the reason why parents should be monetarily punished 
is simply because “you cannot force anyone to love” (2009). Let Pereira explains his thesis 
with his own words: 
 
[…]  this  inattention  and  this  disaffection  must  be  punished  by  a  rival  penalty,  under  the 
possibility that we could have a thoughtless, empty and unenforceable Law. If a father or a 
mother does not want to provide attention, care and affection to those who they have brought the 
world, nobody can force them, but the society has the role of solidarity to say, somehow, that this 
is  not  right  and  this  kind  attitude  may  affect  the  formation  and  character  of  those  who  are 
emotionally stranded. 
After all, they are responsible for their children and this is a duty of the parents and a right of the 
children. The failure of these obligations means violation of the child’s right. If parents do not act 
well, they must pay for it. This is the response that the society must give to the relinquish parents, 
using the law. Would be the affection measured by money? No way. The size of the award is  
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symbolic and has only a punitive function. More than that: an educational function. After all, 
there is no money in the world that can afford the damage and the consequences that a moral 
violation can cause on the development of personality. 
After all, suffering is part of life and adults are responsible for their charms and broken love. But 
parents are responsible for the education of their children, yes, and it is assumed there, give 
affection,  moral  support  and  attention.  The  damage  is  not  caused  by  suffering,  but  by  the 
violation of law. Which law? The wrong exercise of the family power is harmful to the child's 
personality rights, to insist; When a child is abandoned and rejected, she/he has his/her rights 
violated. Minors have not only the right to be named son but also the right of the STATE OF 
SON. 
Every legal rule must match a penalty, under penalty of becoming mere moral rule. One of the 
reasons why the law is exactly the legal force is to impose limits for the ones who do not have 
them. The legal law, external to the individual, is for those who do not have it internally, that 
means, for someone who fails in conforming his/her own and internalized ethical and moral 
precepts by its own spirit. If everyone acted with rectitude, there was no legal need for law. The 
law only exists because there is a crooked. (Del Vecchio). 
Finally, the affect is a legal principle and also an assumption of the authority and the paternal 
functions. As it is not possible to force anyone to give affection, the only possible sanction is the 
remedial one. The failure to establish this kind of sanction would mean rewarding irresponsibility 
and paternal abandonment. (PEREIRA, 2008) 
 
Although this theoretical conception has not  achieved a leading position in Brazilian 
Courts  of  Law,  there  are  judicial  decisions  condemning  the  parents  to  pay  a  monetary 
compensation for “emotional abandonment”. 
Indeed, in the district of Capão da Canoa, Rio Grande do Sul, a father was condemned 
for  moral  and  emotional  abandonment  of  its  nine-year-old  daughter  to  the  payment  of 
compensation at the rate of two hundred minimum wages. The verdict, delivered in August 
2003 became final, with no appeal by the father who also was in default in this suit. 
In São Paulo, a trial of the 31
st. Civil Court of the Central Forum of São Paulo sentenced 
a father to compensate his daughter, arguing that “the paternity duties are not only related to 
material assistance, and that beyond the guard, so regardless of it, the father has the obligation 
to keep his child in his company.” 
Finally, the 19
th Civil Court of the district of Belo Horizonte, Minas Gerais, dismissed a 
compensation action in which the child claimed that he/she would be entitled to punitive 
damages owned by the omission of her/his father's duties to assist mental, moral and affective, 
understanding,  therefore,  that  there  would  deliberate  indifference  to  characterize  paternal  
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abandonment.  On  appeal,  the  Court  of  Minas  Gerais  provided  the  action  brought  by  the 
son/daughter, condemning the father to pay a pecuniary compensation in the amount of R $ 
44,000.00, arguing that it has been configured both the damage suffered by the author in his 
dignity and the unlawful father’s conduct, failing to fulfill his duty to family living with the 
child and creating bonds of fatherhood with him/her: 
 
INDEMNIFICATION.  MORAL.  PARENTAL  RELATIONSHIP  -  HUMAN  DIGNITY 
PRINCIPLE - THE PRINCIPLE OF AFFECTION. The pain suffered by the child, because of the 
paternal abandonment, which deprived him/her from the right to association under the affective, 
moral  and  psychological  terms,  must  be  indemnified,  with  focus  on  the  principle  of  human 
dignity. 
 
Considering  this  case,  the  Superior  Court  (the  court  responsible  for  harmonizing  the 
decisions of state courts and fit them to infra-constitutional legislation), in the trial occurred 
on November 29, 2005 (757.411/MG RESP), reversed the decision and again rejected the 
request as damages claim, stating that "as outside the agency of the judiciary to force someone 
to love, or to maintain an affective relationship, no positive purpose would be achieved with 
the compensation being claimed": 
 
LIABILITY. MORAL ABANDONMENT. REPAIR. MORAL DAMAGES. FAILURE. 1. The 
moral damages presupposes the commission of an unlawful act, not earning opportunity to the 
applicability of the standard in the art. 159 of the Civil Code of 1916, the affective abandonment, 
unable to monetary compensation.  
 
Finally, the matter was taken to the Supreme Court, in charge of analyzing the decisions’ 
constitutionality preferred by other courts, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed the decision of 
the Superior Court, asserting the court to dismiss the RE 567164-0, August 18 , 2009, which 
there were no offense to the Constitution to justify its intervention in that process. 
The justified reluctance of the Superior Court of Justice to impose a duty to compensate 
the cases of emotional distance brought the matter to the Brazilian Congress. In the House, 
the Bill presented in 2008 by Mr. Carlos Bezerra has been examined, which want to include a 
paragraph to art. 1632 Civil Code, as follows: “the emotional distance subject parents to pay 
compensation for moral damage. And the same project intends to amend the Statute of the 
Elderly, adding a second paragraph to its art. 3., stating that "the emotional distance subject 
children to pay compensation for moral damage”. Deputy alleges that:    
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Family involvement can no longer be ruled by just one parameter-patrimonial individualistic. It 
should  also  cover  the  ethical  issues  that  inhabit,  or  at  least  should  live,  the  conscious  and 
unconscious of every human being. 
Among the obligations between parents and children, there is not only the provision of material 
assistance, but also the need for moral support, namely the provision of support, minimum and 
indispensable affection and attention adequate to the development of the children’s personality or 
proper respect for full aged people. In the case of minor children, the emotional trauma caused by 
parental neglect implies deep marks on child's behavior. Waiting for someone who never calls – 
even in the most important dates – the feeling of rejection and anger caused by the indifference of 
others cause deep damages n the child’s personality.  
Among the elderly, the neglect generates a feeling of sadness and loneliness, which is reflected 
primarily in functional failure and aggravation of a situation of social isolation more common in 
this phase of life. The lack of shared intimacy and poverty of affect and communication tend to 
change social interaction stimuli of the elderly and their interest with their lives. 
In turn, it is clear that it is not possible to force children and parents to love each other. It is 
recommended at least to allow the injured to receive compensation for the damages caused. 
 
In the Senate clears a very similar project, which aims to characterize the emotional 
distance as a civil and criminal unlawful. In the art. 4. of the Child and Adolescent Statue 
would be added 2. and 3. paragrafs with the following wording: 
 
§ 2. It is up to parents, in addition to protecting the rights mentioned in art. 3 of this Statute, to 
provide moral support to their children, whether by living together, whether by visiting regularly, 
to allow monitoring of psychological development, moral and social development of the person. 
§ 3. For purposes of this Statute, it is understood moral assistance due to children under eighteen 
years: 
I - guidance on the key choices and career opportunities, educational and cultural rights; 
II – the solidarity and support in times of intense pain and trouble; 
III - the physical presence voluntarily requested by the child or adolescent which can be possibly 
answered. 
 
In other numerous passages, the project strengthens the parents’ moral duty to assist, 
coming not only to consider “illegal conduct, subject to damages, without prejudice to other 
sanctions, the act or omission which offends the fundamental right of children or adolescents , 
including cases of moral abandonment” as yet, provides a possible penalty of imprisonment of 
one to six months, the father who “fail, without good excuse, to provide moral assistance to  
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the child under the age of eighteen, damaging his/her psychological and social development”. 
Senator Marcelo Crivella justified his project by arguing that: 
 
Nobody  is  able  to  doubt that  the  parents’ emotional  distance  produces serious  and indelible 
impact on the social and psychological development of children. 
Love and affection are not imposed by law! Our initiative has not this pretension. We want 
merely to clarify, once and for all, that parents have a duty to direct the education of their 
children and to guide them in the most important moments. Parents also have to provide their 
children solidarity and support in situations of suffering and make themselves presents when the 
child spontaneously requires their company. 
 
As mentioned, it is not said how a monetary compensation (and how much) can be a 
proper compensation for the alleged lack of parental love. But it seems not to be a problem for 
the Escola do Direito Civil-Constitucional (The Private-Constitutional School of Thought). 
For them, what matters is the institutionalization of love by law. 
 
Going to a private school without paying for it 
The Private-Constitutional School of Thought also argues that contracts should be guided by 
love, since the conduct of the parties should be “inspired by overcoming inequalities in one 
dimension of solidarity, placing a contract with a view to cooperation in search for a common 
purpose, based on good faith " (PASQUALOTTO, 2002, p. 97). 
For theorists of Private-Constitutional School of Thought, “the individualistic character 
and obligational traditional patrimonial law” would have been supplanted by a new structure, 
“based on axiological board imposed by the Magna Charta [sic] of 1988, from the ideal of 
distributive justice and substantive equality, as well as the binomial human dignity and social 
solidarity”.  After  all,  “the  contemporary  society  is  open,  plural,  porous,  multifaceted, 
globalized, bringing uncontroversial humanism, aiming to protect the most relevant social 
interests, requiring, of course, new legal position”. (ROSENVALD, 2010. p. 75). 
 
It  defends  solidarity  in  the  individual  autonomy  in  opposition  to  individualism, 
“understood as condoning the senseless personal interest” because “the freedom of each one 
is exercised in an orderly manner to the common good as expressed in the social contract, 
assuming the internal right of freedom (to contract) conforming with the particular relevance 
to the common good. (COSTA, 2006, p. 248).  
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Moreover,  this  school  of  legal  thought  claims  the  balance  between  freedom  and 
solidarity,  in  order to  become complementary: to regulate freedom for the sake of  social 
solidarity,  i.e.  the  relationship  of  each  one,  with  the  common  interest,  which  reducing 
inequality,  allows  the  free  personal  development  of  each  member  of  the  community” 
(MORAES, 2000, p. 55). 
Summarizing, the Private-Constitutional School of Thought denies traditional civil rights 
such as the property right and the right to contract, unless the exercise of these rights is 
directed to the satisfaction of social interests. Thus the contract would not be synonymous of 
an  agreement  between  opposing  wills,  as  the  interest  of  the  individual  necessity  would 
coincide with social interests. The will of the contracting parties would be essentially the 
same. The solidarity and respect for human dignity would be the basis of dealings, according 
to values allegedly taken from the Constitution. 
The  Brazilian  jurisprudence  has  been  affected  by  the  reflections  of  the  Private-
Constitutional  School  of  Thought’s  ideas  and  the  judicial  decisions,  away  from  the  law, 
granting rights to unforeseen ground that one of the contracting parties could not deny to the 
other rights related to existential meaning, because of the principle of solidarity and the need 
to protect human dignity. This means that in order to preserve human dignity, the individual is 
compelled to act in favor of the other contractor, because of an alleged duty of solidarity. 
The private education in Brazil has been fertile field for such decisions with this kind of 
reasons,  in  a  way  that  some  schools  in  metropolitan  region  of  Sao  Paulo  would  afford 
30.3% of the average default (TAKAHASHI, 2007). The legal provision that deprives the 
private  educational  institutions  of  the  exceptio  non  adimpleti  contractus  and  the 
jurisprudential understanding that requires those institutions to enroll students in default – 
right that even the special law denies to students in default – making it almost impossible to 
exercise such activity. The sentences’ grounds, however, is essentially the same: being the 
education a fundamental right, the individual cannot deny students the right to have access to 
this  service.  Here,  in  addition  to  human  dignity  (which  enforces  the  supremacy  of  the 
existential interests) and solidarity (leading educational institutions to put the student's interest 
above self-interest), another relevant theme to the Private-Constitutional School of Thought 
appears  to  be  above  all:  The  immediate  effectiveness  of  fundamental  rights  in  private 
relations, which has been accepted without further questioning. After all, “the fundamental 
rights constitute universal constitutional guarantees. This is the reason why no one can claim 
them dammed only in the relations of public law. Besides this kind of interpretational mistake  
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would wrongly characterize civil law as a branch of legal science, oddly, not connected to the 
incidence of the constitutional law” (ROSENVALD, p. 30). 
As noted from the decision below, the Court of Rio Grande do Sul, in the trial of Civil 
Appell 70004769899, held on April 16, 2003, has denied to a private university the right to 
refuse to renew the registration of a students in default, even with legal rule that would allow 
such practice, arguing that: 
 
Private Education. Non payment of two monthly and renewal of Registration. Intelligence of Art. 
6 of Law 9.870/99. The impediment to renewal of registration can be accomplished only if the 
student has at  least three payments in arrears. The resolution depends on judicial intervention, 
and cannot be carried privately. Application of the sole paragraph of art. 1092 Civil Code. Appeal 
dismissed. 
 
It stands out from the decision, the reasons which led the court to deny such right to the 
educational institution, recognizing, moreover, that it acted with abuse of rights: 
 
a) the default does not allow the interruption of the service provision and should be used by the 
provider the appropriate legal ways to recover, in observance of due process; b) the abuse of 
rights is characterized, within the doctrinal view of the Law 8078/90, because the default cannot 
subject the student to leave the school; c) the Brazilian legal system requires judicial intervention 
to the legal contractual resolution, adopting the French system. 
 
The  legal  permission,  which  provided  to  the  university  the  right  to  not  renew  the 
contract, has been rounded establishing criteria not provided by law, arguing, essentially, that 
the breach - real estate question - could not lead to deprivation of access to services education 
– existential question 
As seen, the imposition of solidarity in obligatory headquarters, rather than favoring the 
spirit’s elevation, presents a great opportunity to lead to the spoliation. 
 
Conclusion 
As Frost’s Mending Wall helps us to see, if it is true that there is something that doesn’t love 
a wall, it is also true that good fences make good neighbors. And still, it is important to 
understand  that  it  is  simply  impossible  expecting  that  law  could  be  responsible  for  the 
implementation of the realm of love and solidarity in this world. The purpose of law is quite 
more modest: its purpose is to make possible the existence of good neighbors. 
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3 Something there is that doesn't love a wall,  
That sends the frozen-ground-swell under it,  
And spills the upper boulders in the sun,  
And makes gaps even two can pass abreast.  
The work of hunters is another thing:  
I have come after them and made repair  
Where they have left not one stone on a stone,  
But they would have the rabbit out of hiding,  
To please the yelping dogs. The gaps I mean,  
No one has seen them made or heard them made,  
But at spring mending-time we find them there.  
I let my neighbor know beyond the hill;  
And on a day we meet to walk the line  
And set the wall between us once again.  
We keep the wall between us as we go.  
To each the boulders that have fallen to each.  
And some are loaves and some so nearly balls  
We have to use a spell to make them balance:  
'Stay where you are until our backs are turned!'  
We wear our fingers rough with handling them.  
Oh, just another kind of out-door game,  
One on a side. It comes to little more:  
There where it is we do not need the wall:  
He is all pine and I am apple orchard.  
My apple trees will never get across  
And eat the cones under his pines, I tell him.  
He only says, 'Good fences make good neighbors'.  
Spring is the mischief in me, and I wonder  
If I could put a notion in his head:  
'Why do they make good neighbors? Isn't it  
Where there are cows?  
But here there are no cows.  
Before I built a wall I'd ask to know  
What I was walling in or walling out,  
And to whom I was like to give offence.  
Something there is that doesn't love a wall,  
That wants it down.' I could say 'Elves' to him,  
But it's not elves exactly, and I'd rather  
He said it for himself. I see him there  
Bringing a stone grasped firmly by the top  
In each hand, like an old-stone savage armed.  
He moves in darkness as it seems to me  
Not of woods only and the shade of trees.  
He will not go behind his father's saying,  
And he likes having thought of it so well  
He says again, "Good fences make good neighbors." 